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What I refer to as “thick voluntarism,” it appears, is closely related to what economist Mike Munger refers to as “euvoluntary” transactions (h/t Arnold Kling). Munger is, among other things, a former Libertarian candidate for NC governor, so not surprisingly, the framing of euvoluntary is deferential to the rightist ideals of markets and property, and comes with ample disclaimers of ‘not that I’d want to make these things illegal or anything,’ or words to that effect. In Munger’s view, a transaction is euvoluntary if there are “no regrets,” while in my view, it is “thickly voluntary” if solvency is feasible. Munger’s stated (in this podcast (mp3)) intent is to build a bridge between philosophy and economics, so there is plenty of hair splitting. My intent is to build a bridge, if you will, between the formal idea of voluntary (which reads to me like the apologetics of exploitation) and the colloquial understanding of what voluntary means.

I also suspect that the difference between the merely voluntary and the euvoluntary may parallel the difference between restraints and constraints. Restraints are imposed by people, while constraints are those conditions exogenous to the human system, such as the laws of physics and perhaps the Iron Laws of Economics. But to many of us, for better or for worse, the difference is purely academic. The constraint-loaded life is not a very free life. There aren’t many real decisions. Everything defaults to the cheapest available everything; the low-rent district, etc. The constraint-loaded life really is lived in a smaller world, and I have a really hard time using the word “voluntary” to describe it.

In The big lie about capitalism… at The Ⓐ Word:

If everyone were a millionaire, who would empty the trash or repair the sewers?

An important point, but the trouble with that logic is that one could similarly argue: If everyone were economically secure, who would… The idea that humyn nature is so constituted that doing what needs to be done, and might not be fun, requires someone to have a fire under one’s buns from (take your pick) competition, precarity, authority…is, more than the state, more even than the dominance/submission reflex, what anarchism is against. So, as an argument for social anarchism, it seems weak.

My thoughts on this are, what everyone wants (well, certainly what I want) is to be a contributing member of society.  Since market economics makes this a privilege rather than a right, there are many of us who would be grateful for the opportunity to work in shit processing.

Or is the distinction between free market and unfree economy one of kind rather than degree? For example, between the set of economic norms prevailing in the United States before about 1980 or so, and the set of norms prevailing since that time, which is a more serious violation of free-market principles? The conventional (and of course flawed) understanding of “free market” principles would lead us to believe that the present is a lesser evil than the postwar era when it comes to “economic freedom,” as so many “market based” reforms and structural adjustments have been undertaken since then. I guess what I’m hoping to hear from the free-market anticapitalists is that the opposite is true; that the changes advertised as market-based reforms are actually steps away from the ideal of free markets, and that the economy was actually closer to the free-market ideal back when there were more jobs with bennies and more job security all around; say 1946-1979 (give or take). I don’t expect such a revelation, as free-market anticapitalists (among others) have identified that period as the “managerial age,” characterized not by economic freedom, but by a type of of bureaucratic order or cockroach caucus that somehow manages to buy off a sufficiently large fraction of public opinion with cushy jobs or what have you. By my reckoning, on strictly economic matters, America 1946-1979 was a better place than America 1979-present. I won’t go quite so far as to say that the past was better than the present because we may have (or may not have) made up for the losses in economic security with advancements in civil rights and personal freedoms, although the latter gains have pretty much been completely erased by the post-9/11 hysteria. My own take on it is that the post-war period was economically better, while the post-Reagan period is more market-oriented. What I want to hear the free market anticapitalists say is that the Reagan “revolution” made the economy less market oriented. That would be the only answer compatible with there being anything positive about the market system.

The basic equation was laid out in an episode of Nature on PBS. The domestication of the dog entailed (among other things) genetically selecting out one or more of the abilities in the sequence of actions comprising successful predation in the wild. An article from the Discovery News website informs us that domestication has been a dumbing-down process for dogs, who are thoroughly pwned by their wild cousins the dingoes and wolves in a food-finding exercise called the “detour test.” This leads one to wonder whether civilized humans, like domesticated dogs, are playing with less than a full deck, which is to say, a skill set less than adequate to the challenge of independent survival.

Skill subtraction is often attributable to non-genetic factors, such as de-skilling in the workplace. One consequence of a partial skill set is interdependence, which is one thing, but what if some people are more dependent than others? How would we go about determining whether this is the case, and which intrinsic abilities are most likely to be found in the dominant classes in human society? Surely there are gains from trade to be realized when people interact with those with complementary skill portfolios. According to theory, even someone whose skills are inferior across the board stands to gain from trade. Perhaps some comfort can be taken in the fact that the related theory of comparative advantage rests on a boatload of assumptions, including full employment. Perhaps the Iron Laws of Economics don’t always have the final say.

One countermeasure against the prevalence of highly incomplete skill sets could be a sort of cross-training program. One would expect an agorist or mutualist community to transform apprenticeship from an entry barrier into an open, inclusive learning opportunity, perhaps following the template in the fifth paragraph of Suggestions for modeling non-monetary coordination in the Angel Economy. The opportunity to be apprenticed in perhaps dozens of trades in the course of a lifetime may help make one less intimidated by the necessity of truck and barter, and maybe just maybe might play a role in the obsolescence of truck and barter.

The challenge is avoiding hierarchies of the ‘you need me more than I need you’ type. Mutualism seeks to cultivate a type of symbiotic relationship that is distinct from parasitism and commensalism. Perhaps commensalism can be seen as the social analog of lifestyle anarchism.

Can domestication and civilization be unbundled? And what of re-imprinting?

Let’s explore whether such an entity is possible. What are the limits of transparent accounting? For an idea of what is meant by transparent accounting, let’s consider the Transparency Extremist blog. Here are some key criteria:

1. “all ledgers are world-readable in real time (other than those from which it is possible to infer sensitive personal information).”
2. “contract is only enforceable to the extent that it is published, and we will provide exceptions and limitations to this principle to allow for the redaction from published contracts of sensitive personally-identifiable information about individuals (including individuals who are a party to the contract).”
3. “We will review the case for permitting non-disclosure agreements at all, particularly where they directly or indirectly restrain competition.”

The use of words like “permitting” and “enforceable” suggests a statist orientation of Transparency Extremist, but their ideas about accounting, I think, are ripe for implementation in non-profit cooperatives organized for the purpose of economic production. Nevertheless, there is much here that might be helpful in allaying some of the more intimidating properties of competitive economics. ‘World readability’ of all ledgers should take a lot of the friction (and one-upcrittership) out of ‘price discovery.’ Enforceability only of contracts in the public record also means less guesswork; that sinking feeling of ‘getting used’ can be compared against what terms and conditions, in general, people are agreeing to. One can get a relatively objective answer to the quesiton, ‘is this par for the course, or am I a fool?’ There is also the opportunity to ask what you might call sociological questions, such as, are certain demographically identifiable subsets of the population consistently subject to certain contractual obligations?

The question of whether non-disclosure agreements restrain competition is worth considering. Transparency Extremist, of course, seems to voice the view that competition is a good thing, and whether competitiveness needs to be protected from secrecy pacts. I have always suspected the opposite. I understand that price transparency is a fundamental property of competitive markets, but suspect that extreme transparency might actually be more conducive to cooperation than competition. Playing one’s cards close to one’s vest is itself a competitive strategy and a competitive activity in itself.

The exceptions to these guidelines for personal privacy are also instructive. While part of me wants to see how far it’s possible to take transparency in commerce, I do value personal privacy, even thought I suspect that it will turn out to be technologically impossible. In that event, the privacy exceptions to the proposed transparency guidelines are moot. For now, I appreciate the differentiation between individuals and entities other than individuals, such as businesses, and I would assume, cooperatives intended to assume their role in society. I have long advocated differentiating between privacy (which applies strictly to individuals) and secrecy (which applies to what I call ‘institutions’).

Agorist Wally Conger brings to our attention a common pitfall of the going-into-business-for-yourself routine; the need to be stingy with information. It’s basically a matter of being assertive, which Conger says is “really a simple mental adjustment.” Of course it’s simple. Probably for some of us it’s even easy. Sooner or later I will probably have to learn it. It seems that wherever the market spreads its tentacles, there is not only the necessity of selling, but the necessity of jealously guarding one’s turf, or one’s market share, or one’s reputation, or one’s trade secrets. “Free market” or freed market, the world is your oyster if you’re the horse trader type; not so much if your strengths are in less extroverted areas like productivity, quality, ingenuity. Perhaps if you replace rentiers with entreprenoors as the leadership cadre of society, the income gap between top and bottom will be less extreme, but even that’s a leap of faith that rests on untested abstract theory. And in any case, if some are more independent than others, some are more free than others. “Lording it over” one another is still the order of the day in the mad scramble for survival in the agora.

Eli Gothill explores the limitations to scalability of gift economies, and also explains how introduction of practically any kind of incentive ends up devolving gifts into priced commodities.

I don’t think the gift economy is necessarily an extrapolation of the existing consumerist phenomenon of birthday presents and the like. For one thing, the first question, as I see it, when blueprinting new kinds of economies, is how to assure the provision of necessities. Necessity goods as birthday or Christmas or other Hallmark holiday presents, if anything, somehow seem in bad form, by the logic of existing consumer culture. Instead of gifts to individuals, I suggest gifts to the world at large (like free software) or more locally, gifts to the nearest “free store” or the equivalent. Instead of inventing a reputation currency, consider implementing a policy of transparency for the free store, in which all transactions of materials in or out of the store, no matter how small, are in the public record. To partially preserve the notion of gift from evisceration by some form of keeping score, there might be an option for transfers of items into the store to be anonymous—the gift itself being on record, but not the identity of the giver. The general idea is extreme meticulousness and transparency of recordkeeping, but limiting ourselves to qualitative accounts of the items being tracked. The deliverables to the public domain are a description of the contents of the inventory, not an estimation of its value.

The article mentions that it would strike us as strange if a couple kept a ledger of household duties performed. Yet it is not at all uncommon for people to give gifts (especially anniversary gifts) to their beloved in the form of coupons good for the performance of some chore or another. These, I suppose, are technically fungible, probably not transferable (but what if the writing on the slip contains words such as ‘bearer?’) but not currency denominated. Something like this might be appropriate as a gift to a free store. A person could issue them in quantities consistent with their capacity for volunteering such services, perhaps with expiration dates so as to avoid having to fulfill a lot of them at once.

Scalability? Don’t know. Maybe it can’t be done. Maybe that’s where a sort of federalism comes in; gifts between free stores. One rather small scale unit is the family, and the article describes the internal economics of family life as almost all gift paradigm and almost no exchange paradigm—to a point:

The most obvious example is the family: goods and services flow between the members of a family, but not according to the logic of the market. Such exchanges are best regarded as gifts: a parent’s ‘services’ to a child can be regarded as largely one-directional gifts with little explicit quid-pro-quo. As the child grows older, the expectation of reciprocation, however informal, becomes more apparent. In the same way, partners expect each other to ‘do their fair share’ in the distribution of tasks and chores that go with running a household.

This paints a picture of a gift economy existing as an island within a market economy. The economic inputs and outputs of the family are most likely mediated through markets, but within the family the gift paradigm is the norm. This may be analogous to my take on angel economics, in which there is no direct attempt to challenge the existing market economy, but linkages to it, being the inputs and outputs of the economic system under construction, are minimized as a shared goal of participants.

Here we have a more or less standard explanation of the fact that sometimes employers run credit checks on prospective employees. I second what Chicagosmith said in the second comment; that the practice amounts to social exclusion, no more, no less. And commenter John Laster, apparently in the “no credit” category, is probably at a disadvantage. Since “no credit” includes the debt-shy as well as the young, I’ve always assumed that the real motive for discrimination against unindebted people is based not on the idea that they are irresponsible, but that they are relatively less indenturable. After all, the more debt you have to service, the more married you are to your income. In the movie On the Waterfront it’s stated explicitly. “No loan, no job.” The same principle may apply to nations as well as individuals. Consider the following:

As with the United States and indeed nearly all countries, EU “aid” is largely self-serving – a combination of export promotion and bailouts for debtor economies to pay banks in Europe’s main creditor nations: Germany, France and the Netherlands.

More export markets=more income opportunities, and these opportunities are being opened precisely because the nations in question are debtor nations. Basically nations are being “hired” precisely because they’re not “free and clear.” It seems plausible that no-credit individuals might be discriminated against based on similar motives. But how would one go about testing this hypothesis? I’ve been giving that one some thought. The methodology might start with that of studies on race discrimination (e. g. this) that feature paired applicants (one black, one white, for example) with basically matched resumes. Here we field applicants paired by credit characteristics; perhaps testing good credit against bad credit, good credit vs. no credit and bad credit vs. no credit. I suspect that “no credit” would turn out to be the most disadvantaged category. Conventional wisdom would expect “good credit” applicants to fare better in the employment game than “bad credit” applicants, but I suspect there may be exceptions to the rule. If the alleged business model of Eurozone bailouts is accurate, perhaps there is a sort of “sweet spot” in which the wages on offer are barely (or even intermittently) sufficient for solvency, given the worker’s particular debt load. This would be plausible as a weapon against turnover—well, employee-initiated turnover.

A market basket is a bundle of economic goods. Since our aim here is to escape from market phenomena if possible, in this essay we’ll call it an inventory. Let’s use the term survivable inventory to refer to an inventory which is sufficient to the survival of a person. Ideally, we can individualize this, not assuming some standardized person as with hedonic indexing along the line of “poverty line” calculations. But our motivations in identifying survivable inventories are very much similar to those behind the “poverty line” concept. Basically the idea is to classify economic goods as luxuries or necessities, but with certain subtleties accounted for. We can speak of an inventory as survivable for a given person. The same inventory may not be survivable for another, due to medical or other special needs. We would expect all survivable inventories to include food, and almost all to include housing, clothing, and some medical products and services. The food portion should supply all essential nutrients in sufficient amounts. This raises the question of inventories that are technically survivable, but not without consequences that affect long term survivability (life expectancy). The choice of a standard of survivability should allow some flexibility. Given a true post-scarcity state of affairs, it would literally be a non-issue, while a condition of extreme hardship such as a famine might justify settling for a compromised understanding of survivability, at least for adults. This is of course not an exact science, but there may be reason to invest some effort in surveying the boundary between viable and non-viable provisions.

Now let’s extend the idea that an inventory is survivable for one person, to asking whether it is survivable for two persons. It is a question of whether it can be partitioned in a way in which each partition is survivable for one of the persons. Likewise for three or more persons. Now let’s take a big leap and assume that information about all assets in existence is public knowledge. We will refer to this condition as extreme transparency, and refer to the combined inventory as the common wealth. By the way, it is not intended necessarily to imply common ownership of this common wealth; only public knowledge of its contents. While enforced disclosure of asset holdings is abhorrent to anarchists, it is encouraging to see that unauthorized actions have probably advanced the cause of transparency more than have those of the authorities. More importantly, we can perhaps establish a community of persons as (perhaps among other things) an informational cooperative.

Using the survivability criteria established above, we consider the question of what is the largest fraction of the population for whom survivable inventories can be partitioned out of the common wealth. Negative utilitarianism (basically the least bad for the least number) suggests we adopt maximization of the survivability percentage as a shared goal. A second goal might be minimization of nonrenewable inputs in the creation of common wealth. Additional goals can of course be piled on, but these two seem to make sense for early stages in the project. Anagorist ideals suggest calculating the coordination by playing a unicoalitional cooperative population game of perfect information. Under agorism it would be multicoalitional, under anarcho-capitalism most likely with imperfect information (with the shared goal of survivability maximization not shared universally, perhaps?), and maybe the “tragedy of the commons” people would make it a noncooperative game. The question of whether a whole population (even a small population) can agree on a shared goal stated in terms of negative utilitarianism is one question. The question of whether the solution can be effectively pursued noncompetitively is closely related to the question of whether anagorism is workable.